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21 MARCH 1973

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TRENDS IN COMMUNIST

PROPAGANDA  
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
**In Communist Propaganda**

**Confidential**

21 MARCH 1973  
(VOL. XXIV, NO. 12)

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## TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 12 - 18 MARCH 1973

Moscow (2814 items)

Kosygin in Iran	(--)	9%
[Kosygin Speeches	(--)	6%]
Vietnam	(--)	5%
China	(5%)	5%
USSR Greetings on USSR- Bulgaria Treaty Anniversary	(--)	4%
French Elections	(2%)	4%
USSR-Italian CP Talks	(--)	3%

Peking (1145 items)

Domestic Issues	(56%)	48%
Vietnam	(4%)	5%
Romanian Cultural Delegation in PRC	(--)	4%
[USSR Economic Failures	(--)	4%]
Egyptian Foreign Minister in PRC	(--)	3%

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.

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## INDOCHINA

President Nixon's assertion in his 15 March press conference that Hanoi is infiltrating military equipment into South Vietnam in violation of the peace accord was promptly labeled "slander" contrived to cover up alleged allied violations. DRV and PRG commentators assailed the President's warning that in the light of his actions over the past four years, his concern should not be dismissed lightly. But they ignored his revelation that U.S. concern over the infiltration had been expressed privately to Hanoi and "other interested parties." Just hours before the President's press conference, Hanoi released a statement by the DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman introducing the new charge that there had been U.S. air intrusions over the DRV--allegedly on the 12th and 13th. Other comment has accused the United States of supplying weapons to the Saigon regime and supporting its violations of the cease-fire.

Sustaining a low posture with respect to Vietnam developments, Peking has avoided authoritative comment while restricting coverage largely to replays of Vietnamese comment, sanitized to remove harsh criticism of the United States. NCNA's report of the President's press conference ignored his comments on Vietnam. NCNA did, however, publicize the 19 March NHAN DAN editorial's allusion to the President's attempt at "intimidation." Earlier, NCNA picked up the 15 March DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's protest concerning U.S. violations of DRV airspace.

Moscow has continued to report charges of allied violations of the peace accord, including alleged U.S. incursions into DRV airspace, but it has devoted only routine-level comment to Vietnam. Like Peking, in reporting the President's press conference Moscow said nothing about his remarks on Vietnam. Warsaw and Budapest observed, respectively, that he had made accusations against the DRV and threatened military action against it, but neither acknowledged his specific charge that Hanoi was infiltrating military equipment into the South.

## DRV SCORES ALLEGED OVERFLIGHTS, NIXON WARNING ON INFILTRATION

Hanoi reacted to the President's press conference in relatively restrained fashion with radio comment on the 16th and articles in NHAN DAN and QUAN DOI NHAN DAN on the 17th. In the past, substantial Presidential statements on Vietnam have frequently prompted NHAN DAN articles under the authoritative signature Commentator. Hanoi in

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this instance presumably preferred to treat the President's charges of DRV violations of the agreement in low key and to focus attention on alleged U.S. and GVN violations.

While the President did not indicate when the private communication regarding Hanoi's infiltration of equipment into the South took place, it seems possible that this was a factor in the timing of the DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's charge that U.S. planes had intruded into DRV airspace. The spokesman's statement, as released on 15 March, said the planes had encroached into areas in Quang Binh Province and the Vinh Linh Zone on the 12th and carried out reconnaissance along the coast between Vinh Linh and Thanh Hoa Province on the 13th. Calling the U.S. actions a "gross encroachment" on the sovereignty and territory of the DRV, the statement claimed that they violated Article 2 of the peace accord which provides that the United States "must stop all its military activities against the territory of the DRV by ground, air, and naval forces, wherever they may be based."

While Article 2 thus does not explicitly mention reconnaissance, a Hanoi radio commentary on the 15th said flatly that "ending military activity" includes an end to reconnaissance. The broadcast went on to explain that this had not been the situation when the United States halted all air strikes against the North in 1968: "Formerly, while conducting the war of destruction against the DRV, the United States pledged to stop its forceful activities. Afterward, it allowed itself to send aircraft to reconnoiter our country's airspace, using the excuse that this reconnaissance is devoid of force.\* A 16 March NHAN DAN article and subsequent comment warned that the Vietnamese people and armed forces will maintain their vigilance and be ready to "smash all schemes and acts of provocation and sabotage and all acts of war" against North Vietnam.

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\* Prior to President Johnson's 31 October 1968 announcement of the total bombing halt in North Vietnam, Hanoi had persistently demanded a halt not only to the bombing but to "all other acts of war," and it had made clear that reconnaissance was considered an act of war. In the face of the U.S. continuation of reconnaissance flights, however, Hanoi made a semantic accommodation and described the flights as "encroachments" on DRV sovereignty, thereby implying that the United States had acceded to its demand for an end to acts of war or acts of force.

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The first monitored Vietnamese communist response to President Nixon's press conference, a Liberation Radio commentary on the 16th, referred to the alleged overflight incidents and charged that "U.S. ruling circles have resorted to the familiar trick of uttering slanderous allegations and verbal threats and at the same time swinging their air-power punch." The Front radio described President Nixon as having said "menacingly" that "there might be rather grave consequences if North Vietnam continued its infiltration activities." The charge of DRV infiltration was dismissed in this and other comment as a "slanderous allegation."

The first Hanoi comment on the press conference came in a broadcast later on the 16th which highlighted the President's warning that North Vietnam should not lightly disregard his expressions of concern in light of his actions over the past four years. The commentary also noted the President's view that cease-fire violations were to be expected and criticized him for trying to "minimize the Saigon administration's violations of the cease-fire while slanderously charging that North Vietnam is introducing weapons and military equipment into South Vietnam." Setting the pattern for subsequent propaganda, the commentary claimed that the U.S. charges were aimed at covering up allied violations--alleged violations which it documented in detail. It also accused the President of aiming at "preparing public opinion for new violations by the United States and the Saigon administration . . . ."

The articles in NHAN DAN and QUAN DOI NHAN DAN on the 17th insisted that the DRV and PRG have scrupulously implemented the peace agreement while the allies have violated it. NHAN DAN charged that President Nixon's "threats constitute a brazen violation" of the agreement because Article 2 calls for a complete cessation of military activities against the DRV, a cessation which shall be "durable and without limit of time."

An 18 March Liberation Radio commentary scoring alleged allied violations of the peace accord provided the fullest details regarding U.S. charges of DRV infiltration. Accusing the allies of fabricating stories "to conceal their secret and illegal introduction of weapons into South Vietnam," the broadcast noted that North Vietnam had been accused of setting up missile emplacements near Khe Sanh and of sending "tens of thousands of troops and hundreds of tanks and materiel to South Vietnam via Laos." A Hanoi broadcast on the 20th said that in the wake of the President's press conference, U.S. spokesmen had repeated the "cooked-up story" of DRV transport of war materiel to the South. The radio added

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that the spokesmen had also repeated the President's "threat" against the DRV, and it cited columnist Evans for the report that a number of U.S. aircraft carriers had returned to the Gulf of Tonkin.

#### HANOI, PRG CONTINUE CHARGES OF VARIOUS ALLIED VIOLATIONS

Other than the charge of U.S. air incursion, little has been added to the communist litany of complaints about alleged allied violations of the peace accord. Propaganda continues to berate Saigon for allegedly continuing military action and refusing to implement many aspects of the accord, including the provision on civilian prisoners and Article 4 of the cease-fire protocol stipulating that opposing commanders should reach agreements on averting conflicts. On the latter point, a 16 March Hanoi radio report on a central Joint Military Commission meeting two days earlier claimed that a PRG proposal to let individual commanders determine the level of contacts necessary was supported by the United States but not by Saigon.

Saigon's charge on 18 March that communist forces were attacking two outposts north of Saigon prompted a response the following day by the spokesman of the PRG delegation to the JMC. According to a 20 March VNA report, the spokesman took note of Saigon's warning that it would take military actions against attacks in the Tong Le Chan and Rach Bap areas and went on to argue that the PRG has always respected the peace accord while Saigon has conducted operations against areas held by the PRG. Possibly alluding to the same engagements, the deputy head of the PRG delegation, at a 17 March press conference, had asserted, according to a 19 March VNA report, that allegations about communist attacks in Binh Duong and Binh Long provinces were "sheer fabrications" to cover up Saigon's "systematic violations" of the peace agreement.

The treatment of the DRV representatives on the JMC was again protested in a statement by the DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman on 17 March which charged that DRV liaison officers had been assaulted in the Duc Pho area of Quang Ngai Province two days earlier. Reporting on 20 March on a "recent" meeting between Tran Van Tra, chief of the PRG delegation to the JMC, and a Canadian senator, VNA quoted Tra as stating, in response to a question from the senator, that ARVN attacks on areas chosen as rendezvous for PRG representatives and assaults on JMC personnel had prevented the PRG from deploying its JMC representatives.

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A 16 March Liberation Radio report also accused the GVN authorities in Kien Thuong Province of using helicopters with JMC marking to fire at "compatriots" and of falsely announcing the pending arrival of JMC and ICCS teams in order to "check on the attitude of our compatriots and Saigon troops" and to "repress and terrorize those who had manifested their confidence in the ICCS." In reporting the 17 March press conference held by the communist JMC delegates in Saigon, VNA and LPA said Tran Van Tra charged that GVN prohibition of such meetings in the past and the absence of any Vietnamese correspondents demonstrated that the Saigon regime represses the democratic freedoms necessary for a third force to "have its voice and play its role."

The communists have continued routinely to accuse the United States of prolonging the mine-clearing operations in North Vietnam and supporting hostile GVN activities. The most attention was given to U.S. resupply of Saigon's armed forces and to the disposition of the weapons of withdrawing U.S. troops. An 18 March Hanoi radio commentary explained that Article 7 of the peace agreement allows replacement of military equipment, prior to the formation of a new government, only under the supervision of the ICCS and the two-party JMC. Since the latter body has not been established, the commentary argued, the replacement of arms cannot be supervised. The commentary, as well as others, charged that the United States is in fact supplying Saigon with arms in order to prolong the fighting.

JMC observation of the departure of foreign forces, beginning on 14 March, has been followed by complaints in the propaganda that the troops' weapons were not being withdrawn with them. The 18 March Hanoi radio commentary, for example, stated that the 165 U.S. servicemen departing on the 14th took no weapons; it is certain that previously withdrawn troops did likewise, the commentary said, and the weapons have "obviously" been handed over to Saigon troops.

#### STOPH HEADS GDR PARTY-GOVERNMENT DELEGATION ON VISIT TO DRV

Hanoi and East Berlin media have duly publicized the friendship visit of the GDR party-government delegation headed by Willi Stoph, Politburo member and Chairman of the Council of Ministers, to the DRV from 15 to 19 March. A NHAN DAN editorial on the 15th observed that this was the first visit by a delegation from a socialist country since the peace accord was signed in January. (The last such GDR party-government visit to the DRV was from 4 to 10 April 1968.) Hosted by Premier Pham Van Dong, the delegation met with

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various high-ranking DRV officials, including President Ton Duc Thang, Truong Chinh, and Nguyen Duy Trinh. While First Secretary Le Duan did not participate in the various festivities, he received Stoph on the 17th.

Both Stoph and Pham Van Dong spoke at two receptions, hosted respectively by each country on the 15th and 18th, and at a mass rally on the 16th, at which time the two premiers took the opportunity to hail each other's achievements, reaffirm mutual support, and emphasize socialist solidarity. Both echoed the persistent theme that the peace accord was a victory for Hanoi, and Stoph stressed socialist aid, observing that the Soviet Union gave the "biggest" backing and played the "decisive" role in the victory. While Stoph not unexpectedly did not mention China, Pham Van Dong typically referred to both of the DRV's big allies. For example, he said at the rally: "The DRV and the Vietnamese people are determined to do all in their power to strengthen the militant solidarity and the fraternal cooperation with the Soviet Union, China, and the other brotherly socialist countries on the basis of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism."

The joint communique issued on the final day of the visit condemned the Saigon administration for systematically violating the peace accord, with U.S. support. However, it failed to spell out specific violations as Dong and Stoph had done earlier in their speeches. The communique went on to state that "the two parties firmly demand" that the United States and Saigon "immediately end all acts of violation" and "strictly respect" all the peace provisions. After affirming GDR-DRV solidarity, the communique said the two parties "discussed measures to support the DRV in solving the aftermaths of the war, in speeding up the building of socialism, and in expanding the relations of economic, scientific, and technical cooperation."

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## U. S. - U S S R

## SOVIET BLOC MEDIA DISCUSS SALT; MOSCOW CITES NAVAL BUILDUP

In line with previous practice, East European media have provided the most forthcoming comment to date on the deliberations of SALT TWO. Most notable was a commentary in the Bratislava youth organization daily SMENA by Michal Havran on 14 March which underlined Moscow's concern about U.S. and allied forward-based systems (FBS). Havran singled out U.S. missile submarine bases and aircraft overseas, as well as the reluctance of France and the UK to consider their submarines as part of the U.S. nuclear force, as the main obstacles confronting SALT TWO. Unlike previous comment, Havran included aircraft on U.S. carriers in the Pacific among FBS systems that "Soviet representatives" claim must be taken into account. Havran also appeared to concede that the second phase of SALT would have to reach agreement on a rough numerical equality in "offensive missile weapons," which was not achieved in the first round. It was his assessment that negotiations on this point would determine whether agreement would be reached by reducing the force levels of one side or increasing those of the other.

Moscow's own comment has continued to be minimal and generally vague, stressing continued U.S. interest in SALT along with signs of domestic opposition centered mainly in the military-industrial complex. Moscow's coverage of U.S. domestic developments affecting SALT was typified by the prompt TASS report of a statement released on 19 March by 14 Republican Congressmen. The TASS dispatch ignored the statement's criticisms of the Administration's "bargaining chip" approach to the negotiations and singled out instead its praise for the earlier SALT agreements and its call on the Administration to press for further agreements.

U.S. NAVY Moscow's continued concern over U.S. sea-based strategic systems was registered in an article in the March issue of MEZHODUNARODNAYA ZHIZN by two USA Institute specialists on U.S. strategy, Georgiy Svyatov and Andrey Kokoshin. The authors detailed U.S. plans for deploying Poseidon and Trident and expressed concern over interest in U.S. military circles in developing a new sea-based ABM system which, in their view, "would unquestionably mean a new turn in the strategic arms race" and was specifically prohibited by the ABM Treaty signed last May.

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Svyatov and Kokoshin saw in the main trends of U.S. naval development an attempt to achieve qualitative superiority over the Soviet navy. They noted that in connection with the ongoing modernization of the naval strategic forces, many American "specialists" have proposed turning sea-based strategic forces into a first-strike weapon. As an alternative to an intensified arms race resulting from the continued naval buildup, the authors renewed Brezhnev's June 1971 proposal for talks on restricting the cruising areas of the navies of the "great powers."\*

#### MOSCOW REMAINS HOPEFUL ON PROSPECTS FOR TRADE WITH U.S.

Moscow's extensive recent commentary on the prospects for improved trade and economic relations with the United States has continued in a generally optimistic vein. While warning that substantial increases in trade can be obtained only on the basis of full equality, Moscow has expressed confidence that the Congressional hurdle on granting the USSR most-favored-nation status will be overcome. That attitude was typified in moderate TASS reportage and media comment on Secretary Shultz' visit to Moscow last week.

Commentaries on the Secretary's visit stressed the constructive nature of the talks and the favorable foreign reaction. It was emphasized that Shultz, "in President Nixon's name," had confirmed the Administration's intention to press for implementation of the goals for trade and economic relations formulated at the May summit and in subsequent agreements. According to the 18 March Moscow domestic service international observers' roundtable, Shultz' assurances on this score were "seen by the world press as an attempt to overcome the opposition of well-known elements on Capitol Hill" who are "trying to interfere in the internal affairs of the Soviet Union." This was the closest Moscow came to acknowledging Western reports that Shultz and Brezhnev had discussed the USSR's policy on emigration.

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\* Brezhnev's proposal is examined in TRENDS of 16 June 1971, pages 18-19, and 23 June, pages 20-22. It was revived most recently in an article on the U.S. Navy by B. L. Teplinskiy in the October 1972 issue of USA.

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## DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE

## SOVIET BLOC OFFICIAL LINKS NONUSE OF FORCE, WDC PROPOSALS

Poland's Vice Foreign Minister Jan Bisztyga has provided some insight into Moscow's preferred agenda for the proposed world disarmament conference (WDC). In a speech at the 12 March session of the All-Poland Peace Committee published in the 13 March ZYCIE WARSZAWY, Bisztyga suggested that the conference should devise an international convention on renouncing the use of force in relations among states and permanently banning the use of nuclear weapons (NUF).

This is the first Soviet bloc statement linking these two elements of Moscow's current disarmament proposals. Soviet media have been vague about both elements. Regarding the WDC, recent public comment--including that surrounding the current session of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD) in Geneva--has focused on the need to convene the 35-member special committee on WDC called for in a resolution of the 27th session of the UN General Assembly. Regarding NUF--also first proposed by Moscow as a resolution at the 27th UNGA session--recent followup comment has been light, although Brezhnev, at the USSR's 60th Anniversary celebrations last December, announced the USSR's willingness to sign bilateral NUF agreements with each of the nuclear powers.\* Bisztyga expressed confidence that NUF would be prominent on the agenda of this year's UNGA session.

**FIVE-POWER CONFERENCE** The Soviet Union is also giving renewed attention to another disarmament conference proposal--a conference of the five nuclear powers first proposed in 1971. Soviet representative Aleksey Roshchin reaffirmed the USSR's interest in such a gathering in his opening speech at the current CCD session, reported by TASS on 20 February. Bisztyga's statement and a commentary in the 15 March Bratislava paper ROLNICKE NOVINY stressed that the proposed conference was still topical. Both the Bisztyga and ROLNICKE NOVINY comments focused on Chinese rejection of the five-power forum. Interest in the five-power conference comes amid other signs that Moscow may be making a renewed effort either to involve Peking in disarmament negotiations or to isolate it publicly on arms control issues.\*\*

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\* The TRENDS of 4 January 1973, page 29, discusses Brezhnev's remarks.

\*\* Recent public pronouncements on negotiations for a comprehensive test ban have also pointed to the need for Chinese participation.

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## USSR - IRAN

## KOSYGIN, SHAH EXPRESS "INTENT" ON ASIAN COLLECTIVE SECURITY

Judging from the communique on his 14-16 March "friendly official" visit to Iran, Kosygin got the Shah to go a step further in supporting Moscow's project of an Asian collective security system by jointly declaring the two sides' "intention" to "help in realizing" the scheme. Last October, during his visit to the USSR, the Shah had confined himself to a cautious remark, in discussing European security, that "perhaps with time" it would be possible in Asia to "consider something resembling the steps that have been taken in the European continent."

The program for Kosygin's brief visit, to attend the commissioning of the Isfahan metallurgical works, included a dinner given by Prime Minister Hoveyda on the 14th, talks with the Shah the following day, and the Isfahan ceremony on the 16th. The communique described Kosygin's talks with the Shah and Hoveyda as having taken place in a "friendly and frank atmosphere on the basis of mutual understanding," the same characterization applied to the last high-level Soviet-Iranian talks, during the Shah's visit to the USSR last October. The communique also recorded "identical or close views" on a great many important international questions. Podgorny had "frankly" stated, in a speech during his one-day visit to northern Iran in October 1970 for the commissioning of the trans-Iran gas trunkline, that personal contacts would help "make our attitudes coincide." He added that "although these attitudes may not always be the same, we walk along the same path" as regards bilateral relations and major international issues.

**COLLECTIVE SECURITY**      The joint communique on the Shah's October visit to Moscow paved the way for the "announcement," in the present document, of Soviet and Iranian "intention to help in the realization of the idea of creating an Asian collective security system."\* The communique described this position as in accordance with the contents of the October communique concerning cooperation and joint efforts

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\* See the 6 December 1972 TRENDS, pages S1 - S7, for a discussion of Moscow propaganda treatment of the collective security concept in connection with the northern tier states and the Persian Gulf.

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by all Asian countries toward securing peace and security in Asia. Both communiques listed the principles on which Moscow bases its collective security scheme, but the October document merely concluded that "it takes joint efforts and cooperation by all countries of Asia to insure peace and security in the area." Podgornyy in a 10 October speech during the Shah's visit had looked toward "practical realization of the idea of creating a collective security system" in Asia, and the Shah in his reply speech had indicated some receptiveness to the idea.

Kosygin, in his banquet speech on 14 March, did not specifically urge the concept on the Iranians but clearly showed what was on his mind in referring to cooperation and friendship among Asian countries, reduction of tension in the Asian continent, and strengthening peace and security for all Asian countries. He stressed that the USSR had reiterated its interest in "joining other countries, especially close neighbors," in achieving these objectives. Kosygin asserted that if Soviet-Iranian relations were based on serving the countries' long-term interests and "the cause of strengthening peace and international security in Asia," this would "eventually" constitute the most important factor for stability of these relations. And he described this approach as consonant with the interests of the neighbors of Iran and the Soviet Union, "since their security and peaceful future, to some extent, will depend on the foreign policy objectives of their neighbors."

Against this background, a Moscow broadcast in Persian on 16 March welcomed the conclusion of an agreement between Iran and Afghanistan--signed in Kabul on 13 March--"to settle their differences" on division of the Hirmand River waters. The broadcast charged Britain and the United States with interference in this long-standing dispute to create discord between the neighboring countries while securing their own "greedy interests." Contrasting the "imperialist policy" of taking advantage of differences with the policy followed by the USSR, the broadcast quoted Kosygin as declaring in Teheran that the Soviet Union would do its utmost to promote and expand cooperation and friendship with the Asian countries, ease crises in Asia, and strengthen peace and security of all nations of the continent.

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**PERSIAN GULF** The brief reference to the gulf repeats the sides' "strong belief," as expressed in the October communique, that Persian Gulf affairs should be settled "by the states of this area themselves" on the basis of the UN Charter and without interference by foreigners. The October communique had likewise said questions relating to the gulf should be settled by the states of this region, without outside interference. Moscow's position had been set forth in a TASS statement on the Persian Gulf of 3 March 1968, which declared that the peoples of the countries in the Persian Gulf area, "and they alone," have the right to shape their destiny. The formulation has occasionally been tailored in some Soviet-Arab communiqués to suit Arab sensibilities, as in Soviet-Iraqi communiqués of February and September 1972 which spoke of the struggle of the "Arab states and peoples in the Persian Gulf area," and the "people of the Arab gulf," respectively, to determine their destiny.

**BILATERAL RELATIONS** Propaganda surrounding the Kosygin visit concentrated on praise of Soviet-Iranian cooperation in the construction of the Isfahan complex. Following on last October's communique, which said the sides agreed to cooperate in the expansion of the metallurgical works as well as in other projects, an agreement was signed during Kosygin's visit on enlargement of the Isfahan works and there was agreement to study other projects for cooperation in connection with Iran's development plan. In his brief speech at the Isfahan ceremony on the 16th, Kosygin stressed that success of Soviet-Iranian cooperation depended not just on various agreements but on developing friendship and cooperation between peoples.

TASS provided only a short account of the Shah's speech at the commissioning ceremony, singling out his expression of thanks to the USSR for its cooperation but failing to mention his announcement of the oil consortium's "full surrender" by which Iran obtained complete management and full ownership of all oil installations. But a Moscow broadcast in Persian on the 20th did highlight the Shah's Isfahan announcement, and credited the Soviet Union with a role in this "Iranian victory," made possible, it said, through successful expansion of Iran's economy "obtained thanks to joint efforts by the USSR" and with the "comprehensive support" of the Soviet Union and the rest of the socialist countries. But the broadcast indicated some misgivings as to Iran's determination vis-a-vis the consortium, pointing out, as had an earlier commentary in Persian on 6 March, that the oil companies were still demanding participation in determining the amount of oil to be extracted in Iran, trying to gain concessions despite the new agreement.

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## USSR - JAPAN

## MOSCOW WOOES JAPAN, AVOIDS COMMENT ON TERRITORIAL ISSUE

Soviet commentators have played up Prime Minister Tanaka's 6 March letter to CPSU chief Brezhnev as a "significant event" indicating that conditions are now ripe for firmer political, economic, and cultural ties between the two countries. Underscoring the high level of the communication, Moscow has directed attention to the fact that Brezhnev personally accepted the letter delivered by Japanese Ambassador Niizeki, his first meeting with an official Japanese representative since becoming party chief in 1964. Soviet spokesmen have pointed out possibilities of closer economic and cultural contacts with Japan in the past--most notably during Foreign Minister Gromyko's January 1972 visit to Japan--but the current campaign has been marked by unusually forthcoming calls to formalize Soviet-Japanese relations on the basis of a treaty ending World War II issues still outstanding.

Direct references to the major obstacle to improved Soviet-Japanese relations in the past--the sensitive issue of the four northern islands occupied by the Soviets during the war years--have been omitted in the current Soviet drive. Previous Soviet comment on Japan had routinely insisted that there was no territorial question subject to negotiation.\* By evading the issue now while expressing warm welcome to Tanaka's initiative, Moscow may be seeking to find room for movement in Soviet-Japanese relations and thus for strengthening Soviet leverage in the fluid new situation in East Asia. Though the Japanese continue to indicate that the return of the Soviet-held islands is an intrinsic part of any peace treaty settlement, Moscow may now hope that the two sides have common interests in improving their relations that will defuse the territorial issue.

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\* Typical of Moscow's hard line on the northern territorial question prior to the Tanaka letter of 6 March, a blistering PRAVDA article on 31 January by V. Vladimirov lashed out at the ruling LDP for having decided to promote a popular movement in Japan for the return of the four northern islands. Vladimirov characterized the LDP as a "revanchist narcotic" for attempting to mount the "hobby horse of nationalism in pursuit of votes" and warned that "the course of world events indicates that the revision of postwar frontiers does not bring politicians any laurels these days."

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The most comprehensive call for putting Soviet-Japanese relations on a treaty basis was contained in an article by TASS director Leonid Zamyatin published in SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA on the 13th. Depicting the present international situation as characterized by a search for "ways to cooperate peacefully, relax tension, and strengthen trust," Zamyatin argued that "all this also applies to Soviet-Japanese relations." Striking a note of urgency on the question of resolving outstanding problems between Moscow and Tokyo, Zamyatin firmly asserted that "the time has come to underpin Soviet-Japanese relations with a firm treaty-governed foundation. . . and to settle questions left over from World War II."

In painting a hopeful picture of better Soviet-Japanese relations, Zamyatin carefully muted the threat of resurgent Japanese militarism--a central theme in past Soviet comment on Japan, including comment on the new Tanaka government. He took a measured look back into history at the "black periods when Japanese militarist forces have brought our country to armed conflicts and even to war," but he said "those times are now past" and stressed the importance in "the complex present-day situation" of strengthening peace. Zamyatin acknowledged that there are still forces attempting to impede Soviet-Japanese cooperation, alluding to the Chinese in noting that these forces are active not only in Japan. But he added that improvement in Soviet-Japanese relations is not directed against third countries. After citing the Brezhnev-Niiseki talk as evidence of Moscow's good will toward Japan, he concluded by taking note of Japanese press reports as saying "Japanese official circles have assessed it in the same way."

The forthcoming approach to Soviet-Japanese relations was also reflected in a 13 March IZVESTIYA article by V. Kudryavtsev which--after taking a thinly veiled swipe at PRC support of Japanese claims to the northern territories--took the view that "if one discounts the artificially exaggerated problems being advanced by the ill-wishers of good Soviet-Japanese relations there are really no serious and insurmountable obstacles in the path of goodneighborliness." Previously, in a 2 November IZVESTIYA article, the first major Soviet assessment of the new Sino-Japanese relationship, Kudryavtsev had taken a more rigid position on Soviet-Japanese relations when he pointed a critical finger at "some of the recent speeches in the Japanese parliament, whose authors are again advancing pointless and absurd territorial demands with regard to the USSR" as evidence of Tokyo's "unrealistic positions" on a "number of very important foreign policy questions."

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Hopeful prognostications on the future of Soviet-Japanese relations were also aired in an Afonin radio commentary broadcast in Japanese on the 13th which noted approvingly that the Japanese press had hailed the recent meeting between Brezhnev and Niizeki as "an important step toward the strengthening of relations between the two countries." Afonin asserted that the possibility is now open "of solving pending problems by taking into consideration the interests which both sides deserve to receive."

Current Soviet interest in stabilizing relations with Japan by concluding a peace treaty to end disputes dating back to World War II appears fueled by deepening concern in Moscow over the rapidly developing special relationship emerging between China and Japan.\* An Afonin commentary broadcast to Japan on 2 March, for example, said that the normalization of Sino-Japanese relations has caused "uneasiness in Asia" because of widespread concern over the potential scope of Sino-Japanese cooperation in economic and defense fields. After denouncing Chou En-lai for allegedly trying to worsen Soviet-Japanese relations by telling visiting Japanese delegations in Peking to "demand more strongly that the Soviet Union return the so-called northern territories," Afonin argued that Southeast Asian countries fear "the possibility that the improvement of Sino-Japanese relations will lead to an alliance between the PRC, which possesses much manpower and great military strength, and Japan, a country with a developed economy and high technology." Afonin speculated that "the PRC is ready to take charge in agriculture and light industry and allow Japan to take charge in heavy industry. This must be said to be a policy of dividing the economies of Asian countries into spheres of Japanese and Chinese influence."

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\* PRC sensitivity to Tokyo's initiative toward Moscow, in turn, is reflected in Peking's failure thus far to report Tanaka's letter to Brezhnev.

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## A R G E N T I N A

## HAVANA HAILS PERONIST ELECTION VICTORY; MOSCOW EQUIVOCATES

Out of awareness that Hector Campora, victorious Peronist presidential candidate in the 11 March Argentine elections, is committed to reestablishing relations with Cuba, Havana hailed the election returns as a mandate for radical change. Cuban commentaries linked the election with such events as the current UN Security Council meeting in Panama and the 4 March Chilean parliamentary elections as evidence of a rising tide of radicalism sweeping Latin America. Although some Havana comment touched on the possibility of a military effort to block a Peronist return to power, there was unanimity that the election results denoted a permanent shift to the left in Argentina.

The most authoritative Havana comment on the elections came from Cuban Deputy Prime Minister Carlos Rafael Rodriguez in a 13 March speech marking the 16th anniversary of the assault on the Presidential Palace. Citing developments in Chile, Peru, and Panama as examples of the growing "failure of imperialism in Latin America," he declared that the Argentine elections showed that "the people have begun to move" and that "Argentina, too, is joining in the big changes." The elections, according to Rodriguez, signified an end to the domination of Argentine politics by a "military oligarchy" in the service of "foreign and exploiting imperialism." Cuban spokesmen have long derogated the Argentine and Brazilian military regimes as "lackeys of U.S. imperialism."

Other Havana commentators echoed Rodriguez' positive assessment of the Argentine elections. Havana domestic service commentator Guido Garcia Inclan on the 17th lauded the victorious Justicialista Liberation Front (FREJULI) as "a majority party" comprising workers, students, and peasants--in his view, "the great strength of the best of countries." The Peronist triumph and the Panamanian performance at the Security Council meeting, he concluded, represented "two great victories of sister nations." In a similar vein, a Havana TV commentary on the 14th stressed that the elections demonstrated "the people's rebuff of the military-oligarchic regime and their determination to impose drastic changes in the course of the country."

The TV commentary, like most other Havana electoral reaction, was vague in forecasting the changes the Peronists would institute but left little doubt that they would be salutary, allowing the

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Argentine nation "to benefit from its wealth, curb the power of monopolies, and take the path to development." The commentary concluded, however, that "a confrontation with imperialism" was likely.

The only Cuban commentary to discuss the probable orientation of the Campora regime was by PRENSA LATINA's Buenos Aires correspondent Cesare Pavoni on the 14th. Claiming that the new regime would be "strongly reformist" and would "prepare the way for subsequent revolutionary changes," he predicted that it would introduce "clearcut restrictions" on foreign capital and impose state control of foreign trade. He also foresaw the possibility of Argentina's joining the Andean Pact and forging closer ties with other Latin American states in order to stymie "U.S. promoted Brazilian expansionism." Pavoni predicted a worsening of relations with Washington on grounds that the new regime would eventually "hurt U.S. corporate interests."

Like other Havana commentators, Pavoni ignored Campora's pledge to reestablish Argentine ties with Cuba, noting only that he would establish relations with North Vietnam, North Korea, "and other countries." Cuban reticence on this subject may stem from uncertainty over whether the Argentine military will permit the Peronists to assume power on 25 May, the date of the presidential inauguration. Pavoni, in noting that there would be an amnesty for political prisoners--a move strongly opposed by the Argentine military--"if the new government does take over," concluded that an attempted military coup before or after the inauguration would be opposed by "the majority of Argentines." In his commentary, Garcia Inclan had also adverted to the possibility of a coup by "the CIA-backed military," but he alleged that the Peronists would not allow such a move to succeed.

**PRE-ELECTION COMMENT** While Havana's pre-election comment had alluded to the possibility that the Argentine military might renege on the elections, it expressed confidence that the Peronists would win a resounding victory if the elections were held. As early as 15 December--before Campora's candidacy was announced--Pavoni predicted that the Peronists were "sure to obtain more than 50 percent of the votes." Another PRENSA LATINA dispatch from Buenos Aires on 8 February likewise noted that Campora was considered "a sure first-round winner." In its pre-election comment, Havana carefully avoided criticism of Peron and even described him in moderately favorable terms, indicating an appreciation of the Peronists' strength as well as a belief that a Peronist return to power could pave the way to radical changes.

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**MOSCOW COMMENT** By contrast, Moscow's pre-election comment was hostile to the Peronists and sympathetic to the Popular Revolutionary Alliance candidates supported by the illegal Argentine Communist Party (PCA). Typically, Peron was described as a servant of "bourgeois" interests, and Peronism was said to be losing its hold over the Argentine masses. However, as a consequence of the impressive Peronist victory at the polls, Moscow abruptly shifted its gears. While the "contradictory" aspects of Peron's reign were duly noted, the FREJULI platform was now described in favorable terms, with the implication that Peronism had changed for the better with the ouster from power of its patron.

The most detailed Moscow commentary was by IZVESTIYA deputy editor Leonid Kamynin in an 18 March domestic service radio roundtable. Kamynin pointed out the many "very contradictory" features of Peron's reign, but he was quick to note the changes in the Peronist movement embodied in the FREJULI electoral program. The latter, he observed, contained "promises of economic and social reforms" reflecting "the direction from which the winds of change are blowing in Latin America today."

Kamynin and other Soviet commentators argued that the Peronist victory represented a desire for change and a repudiation of the military regime rather than an embrace of Peronist philosophy. The Argentine electorate was said to have been attracted by such elements in Campora's platform as "amnesty for political prisoners, the nationalization of private banks, foreign trade, etc. . . . and his promise to establish relations with Cuba, the DRV, and the DPRK." Despite Moscow's approval of the Peronist platform, a commentary on the 21st over Moscow's purportedly unofficial Radio Peace and Progress expressed apprehension at signs the Peronists were "going back on their promises." It warned that "reactionary soldiers and big bourgeoisie" were planning "to reach a compromise with rightwing Peronist leaders" at the expense of the workers.

Moscow's comment on the Argentine political scene has to a marked degree reflected the shifting position of the PCA. Thus, when the PCA acerbically criticized Peron's return to Argentina last November, urged the establishment of a provisional government including all political parties, and stated that it would abstain if elections were held, Moscow media approvingly cited the party's positions. Likewise, after the PCA in January offered to support the Popular Revolutionary Alliance, Radio Moscow endorsed the move, citing the party's claim that the Alliance comes "closest to meeting

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the demands of the popular masses." With the PCA's statement on the 20th, reported by PRENSA LATINA, that it would adopt "a positive attitude" toward the Campora regime, Moscow media may be expected to take a less reserved stance toward the Peronists.

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## COMMUNIST RELATIONS

## BERLINGUER CRITICIZES PRAVDA TREATMENT OF CPSU-PCI TALKS

The importance which the independent-minded Italian Communist Party (PCI) attaches to its autonomous position in the communist movement has again come to the fore following the 12-13 March Moscow talks between a PCI delegation led by party Secretary General Berlinguer and a CPSU delegation headed by Brezhnev. Following the release on the 15th of a rather banal joint communique, which noted points of agreement between the two parties and said nothing about contentious issues, a PRAVDA editorial on the 16th, elaborating on the communique, insinuated that the PCI had backed down from the position it has long held on the decisions of the 1969 international conference of communist parties. Promptly responding to PRAVDA's implication, Berlinguer asserted in an interview in the PCI organ L'UNITA on the 18th that the PRAVDA editorial "does not respect the spirit and the letter of the communique on some points." Specifically, he expressed "surprise" over PRAVDA's reference to the 1969 documents, of which, as Berlinguer pointed out, the PCI had signed only Part Three of the four parts--the one "concerning the concrete objectives of the anti-imperialist struggle." He added: "Our position on this point has not changed since then."

BACKGROUND: In a statement issued after the 1969 conference explaining the PCI's refusal to sign the other three parts of the main document, Berlinguer had declared that "it would have been better to avoid ending this conference with a document which pretends to a scientific analysis of the present world situation and to formulate the general lines of revolutionary strategy--a document, that is, which pretends to give a solution to all the most important political problems and questions of principle which have been discussed." He said that the situation was "not yet ripe for reaching such conclusions" and that the PCI delegation could "only approve the third chapter . . . in which are indicated the concrete objectives of the anti-imperialist action on the international plane."

L'UNITA at that time observed that the first section of the conference's main document overlooked the differences in the socialist camp and failed to explain some imperialist successes; that the second section on anti-imperialist forces was silent

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on the Czechoslovak problem and contained no formula specifically rejecting the idea that socialism must follow a single model; and that the fourth part, on problems of the communist movement, failed to come to grips with the real causes of controversy.

PRAVDA EDITORIAL      PRAVDA's account of the CPSU-PCI talks not only misstated the letter of the communique on the 1969 documents but--like the communique--failed to mention some of the other issues on which the two parties either failed to agree or agreed to disagree. To begin with, PRAVDA omitted the following paragraph from the communique:

The delegations of the CPSU and PCI proceed from the premise that in the development of the revolutionary process in all countries there are common principles that manifest themselves in different ways according to the specific conditions in each country. Each party independently develops its own way toward the democratic and socialist transformation of society and the building of socialism to the conditions and traditions of its own country.

It then omitted the communique's call for respecting the autonomy and equal rights of each party, saying in the relevant passage that the two parties had agreed to work for the consolidation of the unity of the international movement on the basis of the great ideas of Marx, Engels, and Lenin, in the spirit of proletarian internationalism, and in accordance with the "decisions of the 1969 conference." It was this latter claim which prompted Berlinguer's strong criticism on the 18th.

Among the issues which the editorial passed over in silence was one which even the communique managed to embrace within the framework of a declaration that the two parties supported "all peoples fighting for freedom and independence against imperialist and colonial oppression and against fascist and reactionary forces that still exist in Europe." This formula would include the maverick Spanish CP under the leadership of Santiago Carrillo, which the PCI strongly backs and which is at odds with the CPSU. The Spanish party has recently been critical of the developing relations between the Franco regime and the governments of Eastern Europe, including the Soviet Union. Although the communique did not mention Spain specifically in this connection, Berlinguer made it clear in his subsequent L'UNITA interview that Spain was included in the problem of "fascism" in the minds of the PCI leaders, declaring that the "most acute problem is that of liberating Europe from the presence of openly

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fascist regimes like those of Spain, Greece, and Portugal. . . ." Although neither the communique nor PRAVDA mentioned China, it seems safe to conclude that this subject also figured in the talks.\*

TASS REPORT      Following Berlinguer's criticism of PRAVDA in the L'UNITA interview on the 18th, TASS published a report, carried in PRAVDA on the 19th, of the latter which was obviously intended to smooth the ruffled sensibilities of the PCI leadership. Yet while correcting the false implication concerning the PCI's position on the 1969 documents, it omitted a number of other remarks by Berlinguer which revealed the existence of other issues between the two parties, some of which were probably raised in the talks.

It failed to mention, for example, that Berlinguer had revealed that the two parties had discussed Czechoslovakia, and that the PCI delegation had "once again expressed the position taken by us at that time and always reaffirmed by us over the last years." It failed to mention, also, Berlinguer's remarks on the future of Europe, although in this case the omission may have been justified, since Berlinguer did not claim that the subject was discussed in the talks, but referred in this connection to the PCI's recent February Central Committee plenum, where he had discussed the subject.

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\* Accompanying Berlinguer to Moscow was L'UNITA deputy editor Luca Pavolini, who had just recently returned from the PRC as a member of the press corps that accompanied Italian Foreign Minister Medici to the PRC in early January. Extending his stay in China after Medici departed, Pavolini toured the country and returned to Italy in late January and wrote a series of articles for L'UNITA summarizing his impressions of post-Cultural Revolution China.

In one of his articles, Pavolini explicitly noted that, as regards current PRC foreign policy, the constant theme of the Chinese spokesmen was "the avowed Chinese fear of an attack from the north, from the borders with the Soviet Union." Balancing his words, Pavolini noted that the Soviets have "always firmly denied" any such intentions. He went on to assert inconclusively that it was "difficult" to establish if the Chinese fear was a true conviction or a means by which Peking mobilizes internally the Chinese people.

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In any event, it is not surprising that TASS ignored these remarks, since Berlinguer defined his ideal Europe of the future in terms which would be clearly unacceptable to the CPSU:

An independent Europe, neither anti-Soviet nor anti-American, which thus would have friendly relations both with the USSR and the socialist countries and with the United States and would establish a new relationship with the developing countries.

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## CHINA

## CHOU EN-LAI, OTHER POLITBURO MEMBERS REMAIN ABSENT FROM VIEW

Chou En-lai has been absent from public view since 8 March, when he led a leadership turnout of four Politburo members at a party celebrating International Women's Day. On the 11th, Politburo members Yeh Chien-ying, Chang Chun-chiao, and Li Hsien-nien and alternate members Chi Teng-kuei, Li Te-sheng, and Wang Tung-hsing attended a reception given by DRV Foreign Minister Trinh during his stopover en route home from the Paris conference. Yeh, Chiang Ching, Yao Wen-yuan, and Chi Teng-kuei met a visiting Romanian cultural delegation in Peking on the 12th.

The last reported appearances by a Politburo full member were by Li Hsien-nien on the 14th, when he met a Japanese art delegation and attended a banquet for the visiting Egyptian foreign minister. The Japanese press agency KYODO reported that a member of the Japanese delegation quoted Li as saying he met with the group in place of Chou, who was absent from Peking. The last reported appearance by a Politburo alternate member was that by Chi Teng-kuei at a memorial service on the 16th for a former minister of education who recently died. According to NCNA, Chou sent a wreath.

Chou's absence could be explained by personal considerations, such as a need for a rest (Chou was absent from 29 February to 11 March 1972 following President Nixon's visit) or a deterioration of his ailing wife's health. But the simultaneous absence from view of other Chinese leaders suggests the possibility that a major conference is in session. As quoted by NCNA, Chou's speech at the 8 March gathering, which honored foreign women experts and wives of foreign experts in China, touched on a sensitive issue involving the cultural revolution and its aftermath. In what could be read as a reference to the xenophobic excesses of the cultural revolution period, Chou "expounded Chairman Mao's teachings on proletarian internationalism, and particularly his instructions during the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution concerning giving the same treatment to revolutionary foreign experts as to Chinese comrades." According to NCNA, Chou also "stressed" that the Chinese people should "thoroughly eliminate big-power chauvinism" and "actively expand friendly contacts" with foreign countries. Chou may have been justifying and promoting his ongoing initiatives in foreign affairs, an area that was severely affected by cultural revolution radicalism.

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Chou was accompanied at the gathering by three Politburo members who were prominent in the cultural revolution--Chiang Ching, Chang Chun-chiao, and Yao Wen-yuan. Four days later Chou's close associate Yeh Chien-ying was listed ahead of Chiang Ching, a reversal of their normal ranking that has only one precedent and was the more conspicuous in that it involved a cultural affair, Chiang's special preserve. Yeh had preceded Chiang among the leaders welcoming Chou back to Peking on 30 September last year after the premier had seen off the Japanese prime minister. On a comparable occasion, when Chou returned to Peking on 29 February last year after seeing off President Nixon, Chiang was listed ahead of Yeh, as on all other occasions.

A Cambodian anniversary that occasioned a turnout of all the active CCP Politburo members and a speech by Chou last year--the 19 March anniversary of Sihanouk's arrival in Peking in 1970 after his overthrow--was passed over in silence by Peking this year. This could be explained, however, by Sihanouk's prolonged absence. The Cambodian's last reported appearance was on 16 February, when NCNA announced that he had left Hainan Island for Shanghai by plane that day. There was no announcement that he in fact arrived in Shanghai, though his latest "message to the Khmer nation" (dated 4 March) was transmitted by NCNA on the 6th under a Shanghai dateline. Earlier, a statement issued in Sihanouk's name was transmitted by NCNA under a 27 February Peking dateline.

If Sihanouk should surface in Peking by 23 March, the anniversary of the founding of Sihanouk's front, Chou's reappearance could certainly be expected. Last year the anniversary occasioned a speech by Chou at a banquet hosted by Sihanouk. That event was also marked by a leaders' message and editorial comment. Chou's reappearance by 25 March would seem virtually mandatory, since the Cameroon president is scheduled to arrive in Peking that day.

#### REGIME SEEKS BALANCE BETWEEN YOUTH'S ACTIVISM, PARTY CONTROL

Moves to rehabilitate some aspects of the cultural revolution, evident in recent broadcasts praising the revolution and in the relabeling of the purged "swindlers" as ultrarightists instead of ultraleftists,\* have spread to the youth movement. On the 13th

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\* See the 28 February 1973 TRENDS, pages 37-40.

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the Peking domestic radio broadcast a 10 March PEOPLE'S DAILY article lauding the "splendid results" of the cultural revolution and attacking the "swindlers" for "singing in duet" with the Soviet renegades in "attacking the Red Guard movement in our country." The article does not indicate that any new youth rising would be encouraged, acknowledging that because of their lack of experience "in politics and social life" they "can hardly avoid making mistakes." But the article does suggest that tight reins over youth should be looser and somewhat, for the "young people are a part of the masses" and "we must have full faith in them."

The article sounds the theme, usually applied to cadres, that "only a very few have gone astray" and that the main aspects of youth should be distinguished from their minor errors. "Some comrades" are accused of not having enough understanding of the changes brought about in youth by the cultural revolution "spirit of daring to think and daring to act." The article states that the young people's sense of organization and discipline must be strengthened, but cadres should not "request the young people to follow rules and behave themselves according to some old traditional concepts." Daring to think, to speak out, and to make revolution is said to be "indispensable in implementing and defending Chairman Mao's proletarian revolutionary line," and cadres must not "confuse it with anarchism."

The correct way to guide youth along the revolutionary path while taking advantage of their activism is said to be through the YCL and by propagating the example of Lei Feng, a young PLA martyr who always followed Mao's dictates. While youthful enthusiasm must be kept under the control of the party, youthful errors must not be restrained "with a force as great as that of a thunderbolt," but through patient persuasion.

Recent publicity for rebuilding the YCL has also indicated that young people must again be given a political role, though one firmly under party control. The new YCL committees formed in Shanghai and Liaoning are much larger and said to be more representative than the pre-cultural revolution YCL, and their leaders are in the main younger and have behind them active experience in the cultural revolution. But leaders from before the cultural revolution have been included in the new leadership ranks and, unlike the old Red Guards, the organization is fully controlled by the party as an instrument to carry out the party's policies among youth.

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The continuity between current policies and those prevailing prior to the cultural revolution was symbolized by the 16 March official funeral accorded Ho Wei, former minister of education who was toppled in the Red Guard assault on the educational system. Presiding over the funeral was Ho's vice minister, Liu Ai-feng, who had also been purged, while the memorial speech was delivered by Liu Hsi-yao, head of the science and education group of the State Council. Chou En-lai sent a wreath and Chi Teng-kuei attended. The memorial speech, lauding Ho for having "dedicated his whole life to the cause of communism," contained no hint of his political problems during the cultural revolution.

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